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Though poor agricultural land property rights are typical constraints that
many peasants in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have faced since independence,
little has been done to explain their persistence. I will rst discuss the so
called evolutionary theory of property right (ETPR), which stipulates that
land property rights evolve as an ecient response to the economic environ-
ment. The empirical evidence suggests that the policies adopted by African
regimes are actually in sharp contrast to what the ETPR predicts. I will then
present a simple political economy model with three major assumptions that
are commonly observed in SSA countries: (1) de jure political power belongs
to the urban elite, (2) urban unrest is a source of threat to the elite and (3)
a dual economy with urban and rural sector side by side. Major prediction
of the model is that, in such political and economic environment, we observe
poor land property rights if there is low level of urbanization and/or large
gap between rural and urban wages, which actually are features of many SSA
countries.
Key Words: Land property rights, Urban bias, Population pressure, Rural-urban
migration
1 Introduction
Africa entered the 1960s and 1970s with great euphoria for prosperity as most of
the countries got their independence from oppressive colonial rulers. However, the
economic performance of much of the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) over the past half-
century has been disappointing. The slow economic progress in SSA countries is
mainly accounted for by the extremely low performance of agriculture. Agriculture
is the dominant sector in the region contributing to the bulk of GDP and employ-
ment. Table (1) shows the GDP share of agriculture and growth performances in
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1SSA and rest of the countries during the period 1970-19901. During the period,
the average GDP share of agriculture in SSA countries is 34 percent where is the
gure is less than half of SSA share for other regions (16 percent). On average, per
capita agricultural output experienced a decline in SSA while the rest of the world
experienced a positive growth. Given agriculture's large GDP share, the dismal
performance of the agricultural sector led to a stagnant per capita. Since agricul-
ture employs bulk of the population, the decline in agricultural per capita income
translated into widespread poverty.














SSA 34.03 -0.01 0.58 73.93
Non SSA 15.92 1.21 1.82 34.95
All 22.20 0.82 1.42 47.53
Source: World Development Indicators
One of the main factors accounting for poor performance of the agricultural sec-
tor is argued to be inecient rural land property rights [Goldstein and Udry, 2009].
Despite the importance of secure and transferable land property rights (henceforth
LPR) for ecient utilization of land, many SSA countries are characterized by poor
LPR. The so called evolutionary theory of property rights postulates that lack of
private LPR in Africa is mainly caused by low population pressure. The evolution-
ary theory of property rights (ETPR) emphasizes the benet from adopting private
property rights (PPR) and the cost of dening and enforcing those rights; [Demsetz,
1967; Platteau, 1996]. According to the ETPR, implementation of PPR is a costly
activity to the society. Such costs may include the negotiation eort from the early
stage of dening what belongs to whom (or appropriating rights to specic indi-
viduals) to the required resources to protect those dened rights (such as policing,
fencing, issuing certicates, etc). Such costs are weighed against the benets arising
from PPR such as increased investment on the property, optimal use (as opposed
to over-use that may arise under communal ownership), reduced cost from conict
over the communal ownership, etc. When it comes to land, the ETPR predicts that
private LPR is adopted by a society only if there is signicant scarcity of land. In
land abundant societies, incurring the cost to implement a private LPR is not a
rational thing to do and societies will not adopt it. However, as population pressure
increases and land becomes a relatively scarce property, the value of land increases
and society will eventually adopt private LPR. The role of the state will be provid-
ing the legal and institutional infrastructure to provide private titles as the need for
private LPR arises following increased population pressure.
The underlying assumption under the ETPR view is that societies choose policies
based on eciency considerations. In reality, however, policies are not always chosen
based on eciency considerations. Adopted policies mainly reect relative power of
1The averages are unweighted. Taking the weighted averages (by GDP and population size)
doesn't change the overall picture.
2dierent groups within the society. This is particularly true in African countries as
almost all countries in the continent are ruled under dictatorships where interests
of small powerful groups usually take precedence over eciency considerations. In
such context, the ETPR oers only a partial view of the political forces that shape
LPR in Africa.
It will be shown that the political economy forces actually work against such
eciency considerations. In fact, the elite tends to refuse to allow peasants to have
private LPR if population pressure is high despite doing so might be justiable based
on eciency consideration. In contrast, the elite are more willing to allow private
LPR when there is low population pressure in rural areas. The empirical evidence
suggests that it was actually the case in the post-independence SSA.
The reason why the elite lack the incentive to provide private LPR is that they
want the peasants to stick to their land. The elite are interested to restrict peasant
mobility because freely mobile peasants could be a source of threat to their power.
And land policy is used as a means to restrict peasant mobility. The elite's intention
to restrict peasant mobility has to do with the concentration of political power by
urban workers resulting in urban-biased policy. It has been well documented that
urban residents in post-independence Africa have been politically more powerful
compared to their peasant counterparts [see e.g. Bates, 1981; Braverman and Kan-
bur, 1987; Jones and Corbridge, 2010]. The free mobility of peasants is a cause of
concern for the elite because a potentially large inux of peasant migrants to urban
areas in search of better-paying jobs can lead to deteriorating living conditions in
urban areas. Large migration of rural workers to urban areas will worsen the wage
for urban workers due to the extra supply of labor. Such depression of wages in ur-
ban areas creates discontent among urban residents against the elite. The discontent
with deteriorating living conditions in urban areas caused by wage depression (or
unemployment) thus leads to urban unrest undermining the elite's hold on power.
Bates (1981) has documented a number of cases where urban discontents following
deteriorating living conditions were source of regime failures in a number of African
countries. Aware of this threat, the elite want to systematically keep the peasants
in rural areas. Land policy can be used for this purpose by denying peasants private
ownership of their land. By denying peasants the right to sell their land, threat-
ening to conscate their land if the peasants do not cultivate it and redistributing
the conscated land to those remaining in rural areas, the elite can eectively keep
peasants away from the cities. Those who want to move are discouraged to do so
since they will lose their land while those remaining behind are encouraged to stay
hoping that the conscated land will soon be given to them.
This study contributes to a growing political economy literature trying to explain
why leaders adopt bad policies that hinder economic development. Acemoglu and
Robinson (2000) show how political losers may hinder reforms for economic develop-
ment. Rowley (2000) argues that dominant elites in Africa deliberately propagated
hostile institutions to development to extract private rents. The other strand of
literature particularly focuses implication of urban-based ruling elite for economic
development in poor countries. Lipton (1977) coined the term \urban bias" and
provided extensive accounts of anti-agricultural policies both in terms of heavy agri-
cultural taxation and under-provision of public goods to the rural poor. Bates
3(1981) latter documents how African agriculture was brought to its knees through
urban-biased policies. More recent works focusing on urban bias in terms of heavy
agricultural taxes and under-provision of public goods to the rural population in-
clude Braverman and Kanbur (1987), Bezemer and Headey (2008), Majumdar et al.
(2004) and Anderson et al. (2009). Jones and Corbridge (2010) provides a review
of the literature on urban bias. The model in this paper extends this discussion on
urban bias to the hitherto less noticed link between poor rural LPR and the politics
dominated by urban interests.
The next section presents a simple model describing the above mechanism. Con-
trary to what the ETPR predicts, it is shown that high population pressure in rural
areas discourages the elite from adopting private LPR. This is so because rural wages
get lower as population pressure increases in rural areas due to land scarcity. Section
III will discuss data and present some empirical evidence suggesting that the predic-
tions discussed in the model do actually match the land policy in post-independence
SSA countries. In section III, implication for land policy of productivity increases in
rural sector and expanding urban sector is derived. It is shown that broader devel-
opment outcomes in terms of increased investment in the urban sector and improved
productivity in the agricultural sector encourage the elite to adopt private LPR for
peasants. Section IV concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 The environment: the economy and politics
Consider a simple version of the dual economy as in Harris and Todaro (1970) { a
less-developed economy with the rural (agricultural) and urban sector. Assume also
that society is composed of two groups - the elite and the ordinary citizens. The
elite own capital and have political power. The elite are the ones who set the land
policy. A fraction of the ordinary citizens live in urban centers while others live in
rural areas. The urban sector uses a xed endowment of capital supplied by the elite
and labor supplied by ordinary urban residents to produce output. The production
function in the urban sector is given by
Yu = f(Ku;Lu) (1)
where Yu, Lu and Ku are total output, labor and capital stock in the urban sector,
respectively. The agricultural sector uses land and labor. Output in the agricultural
sector is given by
Yr = g(Ar;Lr) (2)
where Yr , Lr and Ar are total output, labor and land in the agricultural sector,
respectively. We assume that f and g are constant returns to scale (CRS) technology
and satisfy the usual concavity conditions: fL;gL;fLK;gLK > 0;fLL;fKK;gLL;gKK <
0;. The total labor endowment L is given by
Lu + Lr = L (3)
4As such, the elite want to maximize the return they get from employing cheap
labor. However, pushing the urban wages too low may trigger urban unrest that
may result in loss of power, leaving the elite expropriated. Hence, even if the elite
want to get labor as cheap as possible, they also want to avoid unrest that may
follow deteriorating living conditions for urban workers. Assume that likelihood of
urban unrest, denoted by q, is a function of urban wage
q = q(wu) (4)
with 0 < q < 1;q0 < 0;q00 > 0. Unrest is more likely the lower is the urban wage.
The convexity of q implies that the marginal impact of reduction in wages on the
likelihood of unrest is higher the lower is the wage rate. This assumption makes
sense since the welfare impact of a unit reduction in wage is likely to be higher for
the poorer workers. As workers get poorer, a small reduction in their wages may
threaten them to cut on their basic necessities fueling their discontent, which in turn
increases the likelihood of unrest. A higher welfare impact of wage reduction for
the poorer workers is consistent with the usual assumption of diminishing marginal
utility of consumption.
The elite decide whether to allow peasants to have private LPR with the objective
of maximizing their rent while taking the possibility of unrest triggered by low wages
into account. The elite thus maximize the expected rent from their capital. The
elite's expected return (objective function) , denoted by , is given as
 = [1   q(wu)]rK + q(wu)K  0 = [1   q(wu)]rK (5)
With probability q, the elite will lose power due to unrest and will get zero while,
with probability 1   q(wu), they stay on power and get rK.
2.2 Equilibrium wage and interest rate without migration
Consider the case where the elite forbid private ownership of rural land, and in doing
so, that they eectively prohibit rural-urban migration since farmers lose their land
when they move away from their plot. In such case, assuming that wages and interest
rates are determined competitively, the urban wage, rural wage and interest rates
are determined by their respective marginal productivity:
wu = f2(Ku;Lu) (6)
wr = g2(A;Lr) (7)
r = f1(Ku;Lu) (8)
Since rural-urban migration is prohibited by denying peasants private LPR, the wage
rates in urban and rural areas will be independent of each other.
2.3 Equilibrium wage and interest rate with migration
Now consider the alternative scenario where the elite allow peasants to have private
LPR. Peasants can hence sell their land and move to urban areas as long as they can
5earn better wages in the urban sector. For peasants to be indierent between staying
in rural areas and urban sector, they have to earn the same amount by working in
both sectors. Assuming that the urban wages are higher (which is typically the case
in many developing countries), rural workers continue to migrate to urban centers
until wages in the two sectors are equalized [Harris and Todaro, 1970]. Denoting the





r =) f2(Ku;Lu + m) = g2(A;Lr   m) (9)
The new equilibrium interest rate, denoted by rm, is given by
r
m = f1(Ku;Lu + m) (10)
where the superscript m denotes equilibrium wages with migration. The new interest
rate rm is higher than the equilibrium interest rate without migration r since f12 > 0.
2.4 Politically optimum land policy
The next question is that when do the elite nd it optimal to allow peasants to have
private LPR. The elite on the one hand want to get as much labor as possible to
maximize the rent from their capital. On the other hand, they want to minimize
the threat of unrest due to wage depression in the urban sector. The elite's choice
will then depend on the number of peasants that migrate to urban centers. As the
number of migrants increases, the benet from having lower wages will be outweighed
by the increased risk of unrest caused by deteriorating living conditions for urban
workers. As long as the number of migrant workers doesn't exceed a certain critical
level, the elite will be willing to allow peasants to have private LPR since the benet
from increased capital rent earnings is bigger compared to the risk of unrest caused
by lower wages.
The number of migrants m in turn depends on, among other things, the popu-
lation pressure in the rural sector (dened as the ratio of rural population to agri-
cultural land, Lr=A). The higher is the population pressure, the larger will be m. If
rural population pressure is large enough to trigger inux of migrants that is larger
than what the elite want, the elite will not allow peasants to have private LPR. Rent
is always increasing with increase in urban labor (since f12 > 0). However, so does
the risk of unrest. As urban wage (urban labor) decreases (increases), the risk of
unrest increases.
Figure 1 combines the two eects and shows the relationship between the ex-
pected return from capital and size of urban labor. For a suciently small size
of urban labor, as we increase number of urban workers, the expected return rst
increases, then reaches maximum and starts to fall. The assumption here is that
[1 q(wu)]r has a unique maximum with respect to size of urban labor. Intuitively,
for a suciently low level of urban labor, the threat of urban unrest is less con-
cerning compared to the gain from having the extra labor in terms of higher return
on capital (or lower wage). However, as size of urban worker increases and living
conditions for workers deteriorate, the treat of urban unrest outweighs the gain from
having extra workers in the city centers.
6In Figure 1, l denotes the ideal size of urban workers that the elite want. It
corresponds to the maximum expected rent the elite can get, R. The elite may
want to increase the number of urban workers if and only if the actual number of
urban workers is below l. Suppose Lu = l0, which is greater than l. Then the elite
do want to relocate some of the urban workers to rural areas. The uneasiness with
presence of large number of poor and unemployed urban residents actually has led
some leaders in developing countries to relocate some of the urban residents to rural
areas. A recent example is the measure by Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe to
relocate the large mass of urban poor in the Harare to places outside the city under
the disguise of "keeping the city's standard". It was though the repeated protest










Figure 1: Expected return on capital and size of urban population
If Lu < l, the elite would like to increase the number of urban workers. However,
they may not yet be willing to allow peasants to have private LPR if this results
in too much migration. For example, if the current level of urban labor equals l,
the elite want to allow private LPR if the number of peasant migrants m doesn't
exceed l0  l. If m < l0  l, the new expected rent for the elite from allowing private
LPR is greater than the expected rent from not allowing, which is R. If m = l0   l,
the expected return is R0, same as R. And the elite do not oppose private LPR.
However, if m > l0  l, say m = l00  l, the new expected rent R00 is lower than what
the elite can get by not allowing private LPR (which is R). Hence, the elite do not
allow private LPR. Note that the elite still want to have more urban workers, but
allowing private LPR will result in too many urban workers that they avoid adopting
it. How large m is depends on, among other things, the population pressure in rural
areas. If rural population pressure is suciently low, rural wages will be higher to
contain migration within the limit of what the elite want. However, if the pressure
is too high, m will be too large compared to what the elite want. Denote expected
rent under the two policy choices by R(P) and R(NP) where P stands for allowing
private LPR while NP for not allowing, and dene R  R(P)   R(NP) (i.e. the
7expected net gain from allowing private LPR). Assuming that a suciently small
percentage of the population lives in urban centers (which is true in almost all post-
independence SSA countries), we will have the following testable prediction:
R  0 if
Lr
A
 a, for some a > 0 (11)
R < 0 otherwise: (12)
Implication of the above prediction is that elite that allow private LPR for peasants
should in general face a lower level of rural population pressure. The above pre-
diction is in complete contrast to what the ETPR predicts { private LPR will be
adopted when population pressure increases, land becomes more scarce and hence
more valuable property. The following section presents empirical evidence suggesting
that this was actually the case in post-independence SSA.
3 A Look at the Empirics
I have coded land laws of 41 SSA countries to identify countries that ocially allowed
private LPR for peasants and countries that didn't. Though the ocial polices may
not reect the actual property right regimes, they can reasonably used as an indicator
for the elite's commitment to private LPR. A review of land laws for the countries
studied in this paper can be found from a document produced in Country Prole of
Land Tenure: Africa (1996). Most of the countries adopted their land policy during
the 1960s and 1970s soon after independence. Out of those 41 countries, about a
quarter of them (10 countries) allowed private LPR while the rest did not.
Data on agricultural land and rural population is available from FAO. For each
country, I have used observations for the year the country adopted its land pol-
icy. Figure 2 presents the cumulative distribution of population pressure in rural
areas (the number of rural population per hectare of agricultural land) by the two
regimes { regimes that allowed private LPR and regimes that did not. As we see
from the graph, regimes that allowed private LPR do have low population pressure
(concentrated toward zero) while the regimes that didn't allow tend to have higher
population pressure. In private LPR regimes, the maximum rural population pres-
sure is 0.64 while it is about 2.66 in non-private LPR regimes. And for 90 percent
of the private LPR regimes, the population pressure is below 0.5. Less than 60
percent of the non-private LPR regimes have population pressure below 0.5. This
clearly suggests that land-abundant SSA regimes have shown more tendency to al-
low peasants to have private LPR. In regimes that allowed private LPR, the average
number of rural population per hectare is 0.26, whereas it is more than twice (i.e.
0.61 people per hectare) in regimes that didn't allow private LPR.
Table 2 presents a regression analysis to test whether the above observation is
robust under alternative specications. The dependent variable is a dummy taking
0 for the regime that doesn't allow private LPR and 1 for the one that allows.
Column I presents the estimated coecient considering the agricultural popula-
tion pressure as the only right-hand-side (RHS) variable. We see that agricultural
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Figure 2: CDF of rural population pressure under the two regimes
allow peasants to have private LPR. Robust standard errors are reported in paren-
thesis. Other factors may also aect regimes policy choices. Their choice might,
for example, be aected by the level of economic development in the country. To
control for such eect, Column II presents regression estimates with log GDP as an
additional RHS variable. The estimated coecient for population pressure is still
signicant. In order to allow for colonial legacies on the regimes policies, I also
included dummy for British and French colony. The result is reported in column
III. The estimated coecient on rural population pressure doesn't change at all, and
it is signicant. In general, French colonies allowed private LPR more than their
British counterpart. Column IV includes dummies for Eastern and Western African
countries to allow for regional factors that might have aected land policies. The co-
ecient for agricultural population pressure basically remains unchanged. The gen-
eral pattern we observe in the data suggests that land policies in post-independence
SSA countries did not follow the pattern predicted by ETPR. The policies rather
seem to follow the predictions from the model discussed above.
4 Implication of non-farm investment and agri-
cultural productivity for land policy
The above theoretical model can be used to derive various comparative statics to
study the conditions under which the elite will be willing to allow private LPR.
A relevant condition is the level of industrialization which is captured by K in the
9Table 2: Populatoin Pressure and Land Policy: Regression Results
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Agricultural population pressure -0.19*** -0.16** -0.15** -0.16*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Log GDP 0.12 0.09 0.09
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Dummy for British colony -0.20 -0.20
(0.14) (0.14)
Dummy for French colony 0.14 0.17
(0.20) (0.22)
Dummy for East Africa 0.03
(0.21)
Dummy for West Africa -0.04
(0.17)
Constant 0.34*** -0.52 -0.28 -0.29
(0.09) (0.80) (0.79) (0.90)
Observations 41 41 41 41
R-Square 0.07 0.09 0.19 0.19
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
model. Increased investment in the urban sector enhances the capacity of city centers
to absorb more labor without substantial reduction in urban wages. In terms our
model, such investment implies higher K. Figure (3) illustrates the impact of urban
investment on the elite's return. The increase in K will shift the return curve to the
right. Denoting the initial level of urban labor size by l, the elite now are willing
to accommodate a larger number of migrants (l00   l) compared to the case with
lower K, where the elite is willing to accommodate only l0   l. The implication is
that expanding activities in the urban sector can have a positive role for agricultural
development by providing a better incentive for regimes to allow LPR. Regimes
once afraid of depressed wage in urban areas will no longer face such threat as
investment in the urban sector increases. The same holds true for improvement in
agricultural productivity, albeit with a dierent mechanism. Improved agricultural
productivity increases rural wages. This in turn decreases the number of migrants
to urban centers who leave agricultural employment in search of better paying jobs
in the urban sector. Knowing that they will not face a large number of migrant
workers ooding the city centers, the elite are now more willing to allow for private
LPR. Improvement in agricultural productivity hence has similar eect as decrease
in rural population pressure.
These two implications are important for policy makers that promote improved





Figure 3: Urban investment and LPR
and spent a large sum of money during the past decade promoting better LPR
for peasants. Such policy should be integrated with urban development and other
agricultural programs that improve rural wages so as to encourage African elite to
adopt private LPR for their vast majority of peasants.
5 Conclusion
This paper has attempted to further our understanding on the political economy
forces that has shaped land policies in SSA. The ETPR provides only a partial view
of the political economy forces that shaped African land policy. Taking two common
features of most African states as the main assumption { dual nature of the economy
and concentration of political power in urban centers { the theory presented here
shows that land policy arises as another manifestation of urban bias. The empirical
evidence is in contrast to what the ETPR predicts. It rather matched the prediction
presented by the theory in this paper. The comparative statics show that advocacy
works (by institutions such as the World Bank) that encourage African leaders to
adopt private LPR should be integrated with other development programs such
as increased employment opportunities in urban areas and improved agricultural
productivity. Otherwise, leaders are likely to remain reluctant to adopt private
LPR.
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